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Post by Don Quixote on Nov 13, 2014 10:37:04 GMT 5.5
<Creating a new thread, for Polity related topics; there is a separate thread for Pol Sci optional> Compulsory Voting
The Gujarat government’s new law making voting compulsory in local body elections raises the constitutional question whether citizens, qualified to be electors, can be compelled to vote when they do not wish to. The idea of making voting compulsory in response to declining voter turnout in successive elections has been debated for many years, but the principal objection has always been that voting in a particular way, or even refraining from voting, is a matter concerning the freedom of expression. The Supreme Court has recognised that the act of choosing one candidate over another falls under the freedom of expression guaranteed in Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. Further, practical difficulties of imposing compulsory voting, including provision for much larger number of booths, setting up a parallel mechanism of sending notices to absentee voters, following up on their appeals, etc. are also abound. While Gujarat has the right to adopt laws in tune with the aspirations of its own people, legislation such as this with far-reaching consequences is best adopted after evolving a wider consensus. As far as general voting principles go, it is relevant to see what Section 79(d) of the Representation of the People Act says: that “electoral right” includes the right “to vote or refrain from voting at an election”. Src: www.thehindu.com/opinion/editorial/editorial-on-compulsory-voting-in-gujarat/article6591701.eceMore: www.prsindia.org/theprsblog/?p=3370
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Post by Deleted on Dec 30, 2014 8:33:15 GMT 5.5
123. Power of President to promulgate Ordinances during recess of Parliament.—(1) If at any time, except when both Houses of Parliament are in session, the President is satisfied that circumstances exist which render it necessary for him to take immediate action, he may promulgate such Ordinances as the circumstances appear to him to require.
(2) An Ordinance promulgated under this article shall have the same force and effect as an Act of Parliament, but every such Ordinance— (a) shall be laid before both Houses of Parliament and shall cease to operate at the expiration of six weeks from the reassembly of Parliament, or, if before the expiration of that period resolutions disapproving it are passed by both Houses, upon the passing of the second of those resolutions; and (b) may be withdrawn at any time by the President.
Do the Insurance and Land Acquisition ordinances meet the criterion of requiring " immediate action" ? Is that the intent of Art.123?
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Post by Don Quixote on Dec 30, 2014 16:06:47 GMT 5.5
123. Power of President to promulgate Ordinances during recess of Parliament.—(1) If at any time, except when both Houses of Parliament are in session, the President is satisfied that circumstances exist which render it necessary for him to take immediate action, he may promulgate such Ordinances as the circumstances appear to him to require. . . Do the Insurance and Land Acquisition ordinances meet the criterion of requiring " immediate action" ? Is that the intent of Art.123? Neither did the Food Security Bill require an immediate action! Now, the debate starts. One can argue that the Food Security Bill addressed hunger of the weakest sections of the society and hence there was a justification in pushing through the ordinance route, though not pushing the ordinance wouldn't have made any change on ground on day zero itself and status quo would have continued for a much longer period. Similarly, the current government can cite lack of progress/investment in many infra projects because of the "lopsided" LARR Bill and hence the ordinance was required. To take one more example, we have seen cases where state governments have blatantly brought in ordinances where they know clearly that a bill on the same topic would be defeated in their assembly would be defeated or a discussion would invite public wrath / judicial scrutiny. Case in point being the Muslim reservation related ordinances in Maharasthra / Andhra Pradesh Assemblies where governments passed ordinances before elections. On a general level, governments seem to have come around to view ordinances as a way to show their intent in clear terms where the opposition may be in agreement with the government in principle, but the act of passing the bill into an act is not accomplished for various non-issues. This is clearly the case when the Union govt considered passing the FDI in Insurance and LARR amendments through the ordinance route because the upper house was not functioning well.
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Post by Lisbeth Salander on Dec 30, 2014 23:25:27 GMT 5.5
@nkit There's a catch in Art. 123. The sole judge of 'immediate action' clause is the President, and the genuineness of the President's satisfaction can be challenged in a Court only if it is mala fide. But, to establish mala fides is not easy. Unless this ambiguity (subjectivity) is taken care of, the true motive of ordinance-making is bound to be questioned.
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Post by Lisbeth Salander on Jan 3, 2015 2:39:06 GMT 5.5
@nkit There's a catch in Art. 123. The sole judge of 'immediate action' clause is the President, and the genuineness of the President's satisfaction can be challenged in a Court only if it is mala fide. But, to establish mala fides is not easy. Unless this ambiguity (subjectivity) is taken care of, the true motive of ordinance-making is bound to be questioned. A critique of Ordinance-making
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